

CSPM: Metamodel for Security and Privacy Knowledge in Cloud Services*

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ABSTRACT

It is important to ensure security and privacy in cloud services. Although there are many security and privacy patterns as well as non-pattern-based knowledge such as practices and principles in cloud services, it is difficult to select and combine the right ones due to the vast volume of such items and the nature of the layered cloud stack. Herein we propose a metamodel called the Cloud Security and Privacy Metamodel (CSPM) to handle security and privacy in cloud service development and operations. CSPM can be utilized to classify and reuse existing cloud security and privacy patterns and practices in a consistent and uniform manner. Moreover, CSPM can also be used to design and maintain cloud service systems incorporating security and privacy. In a case study to model a cloud service, we confirm that CSPM is useful to consistently design services with applications of various security and privacy knowledge over different layers.

*The background and the former version of the metamodel described in this paper were presented at [1, 2]. Here an extended metamodel along with its case study are described.

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CCS CONCEPTS

•Computer systems organization → Cloud computing; •Software and its engineering → Software architectures; Design patterns; •Security and privacy → Systems security; Software security engineering;

KEYWORDS

Cloud computing, security patterns, privacy patterns, software and system architecture

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1 INTRODUCTION

Because service providers centrally control services and data, which are remotely available and often connected with other services [3], ensuring security and privacy in cloud services is particularly important. However, not all software engineers are experts on security and privacy (S&P) [4], making it is difficult to incorporate a variety of S&P concerns in various software lifecycle stages.

A pattern is an abstraction from a concrete form that recurs in non-arbitrary contexts. Pattern catalogs (and pattern languages as well) should enable the coherent integration and presentation of the relevant background, leitmotif, and metaphors [5]. In the area of cloud computing and

services, many security and privacy patterns have been published [6–11]. Moreover, non-pattern-based knowledge in the form of practices and principles has been well documented to address security and privacy issues in cloud services.

The vast number of S&P patterns and documents describing related knowledge in cloud services makes the selection (and combination) of the right ones difficult. This problem is common to security patterns in general [4, 12, 13], but is more severe in cloud services due mainly to the following two reasons. First, cloud services and their underlying mechanisms are related to various layers in the layered stack of cloud [14] and often integrated over different layers [3]. Second, a variety of devices are connected to cloud computing systems, which may require different deployment models and diverse services, resulting in a highly complex system [15]. This leads to many concerns, including S&P.

Metamodels or reference architectures that capture the essential concepts related to S&P in the layered stacks of cloud should address the aforementioned problem since engineers can describe security and privacy-related knowledge as well as design systems and services using knowledge consistently over different layers. Although several metamodels [15, 16] and abstract reference architectures [17] address cloud security, none of these addresses privacy in cloud services. Since the relation between security and privacy is complex [18], it is preferable to deal with S&P simultaneously. On the other hand, there are several metamodels and conceptual models to address both S&P [19, 20], but they are generally defined in such a way that makes applying them directly to cloud services difficult.

Thus, we propose a metamodel called “Cloud Security and Privacy Metamodel (CSPM)” to address S&P in cloud services by integrating and extending existing cloud security metamodels together with newly added concepts. Figure 1 shows how CSPM would be used in cloud services development and maintenance. CSPM provides the basis to describe and accumulate security and privacy-related knowledge over different layers, making it easier to select and combine the right patterns and related knowledge to address S&P issues in cloud services. Moreover, engineers and developers can refer to CSPM to design high-level architectures of cloud service systems efficiently and effectively. To confirm the usefulness and feasibility of CSPM, we conducted a case study that models a cloud service with a privacy pattern and related knowledge based on CSPM.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, we propose our metamodel in Section 2. In Section 3, we describe the case study. Finally, we conclude our work and discuss the future direction in Section 4.

2 CLOUD SECURITY AND PRIVACY METAMODEL (CSPM)

Based on the information described in Section 1, we identified the following three requirements for designing the metamodel:




Figure 1: Overview of the metamodel and cloud services

- R1. The metamodel must consistently deal with security and privacy-related knowledge over different layers, including the software application layer, the platform layer, and the infrastructure layer. Services corresponding to these layers are SaaS (Software as a Service), PaaS (Platform as a Service), and IaaS (Infrastructure as a Service). From the user’s viewpoint, each service is provided at a certain layer; however, the data controlled by the service may be related to any layer [14]. Moreover, cloud services are often integrated over different layers so that careful consideration of security over different layers is important [21]. This is also important for privacy.
- R2. The metamodel has to be mostly consistent with existing cloud security metamodels and reference architectures so that engineers and developers can utilize assets based on our metamodel and those based on existing metamodels (and reference architectures).
- R3. The metamodel allows engineers and developers convenient access to a knowledge base containing cloud-specific and cloud-independent knowledge. For example, there are many S&P patterns that are not specific to cloud services [22, 23], which can be applied to or support cloud service development.

We designed CSPM to consist of seven packages. Its overview is shown in Fig. 3 illustrating six packages with a special package (i.e., “Target”) that combines all packages.

Moreover, Fig. 3 describes details of CSPM in the form of UML class diagram. Table 1 describes the outline and major concepts of these packages. The metamodel satisfies the above requirements as follows:

- The problem, bridge, and solution packages capture concepts common to all layers, and organize their relationships. Using these packages as a foundation for all layers yields consistent handling of security and privacy-related knowledge over different layers. This satisfies R1.




Figure 3: Details of metamodel




Figure 2: Overview of metamodel for security and privacy in cloud services

Table 1: Packages in the metamodel

Package	Outline	Major concepts
Problem	Common concepts for problems	Threat, vulnerability, attack
Bridge	Concepts on the relationships between problems and their corresponding solutions	Pattern, case, guideline
Solution	Common concepts for solutions	General solution (i.e., countermeasure), security function, practice
Application	Concepts specific to the software application layer	Application, coding rule
Platform	Concepts specific to the platform layer	Virtual environment, virtual storage
Infrastructure	Concepts specific to the infrastructure layer	Virtual machine, hardware
Target	Concepts specific to the target application	Goal, policy, asset, cloud service

- The aforementioned common packages incorporate the most of concepts with relationships defined in existing metamodels [15, 16], so that the entire metamodel is mostly consistent with existing metamodels. This satisfies R2.
- By separating general concepts in the problem, bridge, and solution packages from those specific to a certain layer, cloud-specific and cloud independent knowledge is easier to access. This satisfies R3.

3 CASE STUDY

To confirm the usefulness and feasibility of CSPM, we conducted a case study of modeling a cloud service with applications of various S&P knowledge over difference layers. Let's assume that the service provider has a privacy goal of "protecting the confidentiality of personal information" and has established a corresponding privacy policy. Regarding the goal and the policy, developers could specify a misuse case (i.e., actions to harm the system) as "unauthorized access to personal information". Figure 4 shows the structure of the problematic design of the service without any security function based on CSPM, while Fig. 5 shows its corresponding behavior.

By referring to existing knowledge sources such as S&P pattern catalogs, developers find that a privacy pattern of "encryption with user-managed keys" [11] can protect the service from the misuse. The application of the pattern requires developers to consistently adopt a set of necessary knowledge and elements over different layers such as "encryption" as a security function, "generating a strong encryption key" as a guideline and code for generating the key as a coding rule. Figure 6 shows the structure of the design of the service with the application of the pattern and the related knowledge as instances of concepts in CSPM, while Fig. 7 shows its corresponding behavior. Fig. 6 and 7 are shown in the form of standard UML class diagram and sequence diagram, respectively.

These figures show that the confidentiality of personal information is protected by encryption and decryption. Moreover, we confirmed that the necessary elements involved in the pattern and their relationships over different layers can be clearly and consistently modeled by instantiating CSPM. Using CSPM, developers and engineers can easily recognize when and how to avoid misuse.

4 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

We proposed a metamodel, CSPM, to address security and privacy in cloud services and implemented a simple case study. We plan to conduct more complex case studies such as integrating many S&P patterns, designing cloud service architectures based on CSPM, and implementing them; these cases will be comprehensive and span from requirements to implementation.

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


Figure 4: Structure of a problematic service




Figure 5: Behavior of the problematic service




Figure 6: Structure of the service with encryption and related knowledge




Figure 7: Behavior of the service with encryption and related knowledge