Refere	Title	Authors	Year	Journal or Conference name	Vo No I	Research topic		Concrete misuse/t hreat/att ack patterns	hips among patterns	Characte ristics	Vulnerabi lity and threats addresse d	Quality Measure ment	Pattern modeling /descript ion notation	Intended dev. Methodol ogy	Evaluatio n	Phase/lif estage	Tooling/ automati on	Platform depende nce
4	A compositive process for developing secure compositive based approachers	Bousziz R, Kallel S, Coulette B.	2014	Proceedings of the National on Enabling Technologies Inhamosture for Calabrative Enterprises, WETICE		Pattern integration	Authentication, authorization, REAC		N/A		N/A	N/A	SPEM for process, Java/AspectJ code	Model driven methodology	Example	Repiremento lendynio, desigo, implementation	Princips had for assumed integration and make generation	EJB platform
5	A comparative study of software security pattern classifications	Alvi A.K., Zulkernine M.	2012	Proceedings - 2013 7th International Conference on Analysis by Analysis and Ecountry AREE 2013		Classification, Catalog, Map	N/A	N/A	N/A		Threat modeling	Classification quality metrics	N/A	N/A	N/A	Any	N/A	N/A
6	A comprehensive pattern-driven security methodology for distributed systems	Usunav AV, Fernandro ESE, Fallerer K.	2014	Proceedings of the Australian Software Engineering Conference, ASMEC		Development methodology	Automiculus, Source terryoty communications,	h II / A	Yes	Unclear	Unclear	N/A		N/A	Example	Requirements analysis, design	N/A	N/A
/	A comprehensive pattern-oriented approach to engineering security methodologies	pp. 112-123 Sinores AX Fallows, Fernandos Edit.		Inf Softw Technol		Development methodology		N/A N/A	Yes	N/A	N/A	N/A	pattern language	methodology engineering	None	All	N/A	N/A
9	A decision support map for security patterns application	Bouaziz R, Kammoun S.	2015	terleri Miles in Resignal Micros Scotladig sallesten kenten Milesco Afficial Medigense antinatura Milesco Mile	9158	Classification, Catalog, Map	Milit Seen, Spinnisch für Adminisch Minne sonle	None	Yes Yes	Confidentiality, availability	N/A None	N/A	One to Long to	MDD, ADP (aspect-oriented programming)	Example	Analysis, Design, Implementation	N/A	N/A
10		Magazine P. Aprosposicio - Nazyle N. Saladarch, Natharch, Saladarch	2014	terleri Miles in Resignal Micros Scotladig sallesten kenten Milesco Afficial Medigense antinatura Milesco Mile	4082 LNCS	Knowledge base and repository		None	No	Confidentiality, Accountability	CVSS	None None	Ontology OWL	None MDD	None None	All	Ontology query language	Not specified
11	A framework for security driven software evolution	Guan H., Wang X., Yang H.	2014	Lecture Notes in Electrical Engineering	220	Pattern extraction	TLS indicator	phishing	W	Not Specified	0733	No		N/A	simple example	UI design	NDA, Protégé OWL API	No
12	A method for web security centent patterns development from user interface Quidelines based on structural and testual analysis	Singpant P., Prompoon N.	2012	Computers and Security	31 3	Pattern extraction	TLS Indicator	N/A	No	artinosti, regis, artinostic artinostic antinis, artinostici, (SE)		N/A	UML + OCL	MDD	simple example	Of design	110	N/A
13	A methodology for integrating access control policies within database development	Alternary J. Ameri G. Dahen M. Dharel P. Daem A.	2010	Computers and Security	01 0	Pattern extraction	Authenticator	IN/ A	Yes	Unclear (confidentiality, integrity)	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Example	design and implementation	N/A	N/A
14	A methodology to develop secure systems using patterns	Ryoo J., Laplante P., Kazman R.	2006	Proceedings of the Annual Hawai International Conference on System Sciences		Development methodolomi	Addienticator		Yes	Confidenticality	N/A	N/A	UML		N/A	architecture design	N/A	general
15	A modeling and formal approach for the precise specification of security patterns	Hamid B., Percebois C.	2014	engines according to account engineering. Assertes and Peters Victoria		Specification	Process Communication Batterns		Yes	Confidenticality	N/A	N/A	Original Statement Statement and	N/A	N/A	Design	Verification Tool	N/A
16	A multi-dimensional classification for users of security patterns	Variable M. Europeier E.B. Boar E.	2009	Journal of Research and Practice in Information Technology	41 2	Classification Catalog Man	18/98 Access Carbol Endador Ration	N/A	No	N/A	,	N/A	Original Products apacinization	,	N/A	2 00.8	N/A	N/A
17		Alvi A.K. Zulkernine M.	2011	Secretary Wilde Association on Provide Association (Secretary Addition		Classification Catalog Man	ACID. ACIDS CONSTRUCTOR	N/A	Yes	CIA + accontability	Yes	N/A	Tampista structured document		N/A	Denoisements design implementation	N/A	N/A
18	A novel approach for the development and deployment of security patterns	Mourad A. Otrok H. Basiour L.	2010			Application	or Administration from Security and Security of	n/a	no	availability	Yes	n/a	UML, natural langage	Aspect-oriented Programming	no	design, requirement	no	no
19	A pattern based approach for secure database design	Abramov J., Sturm A., Shoval P.	2011	Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing	83 LNBSP	Application	Authorization, RBAC	N/A	No	Confidentiality		N/A	UML with CCL	N/A	None	Design, Implements		N/A
20	A pattern-based general security framework : AAAAn ebusiness case study	Emaneur A, Ferei I, Zaidana A, Sirba SX	2009	300 116 SEE biamainal Corbrase in High Performance Computing and Communications, IPICC 2008		Application	Na harra house's furnic (parint lawly	N/A	No	N/A	repudiation	N/A	N/A	SI*, Secure Tropos	None	All	N/A	SERENITY
21	A pattern-driven security advisor for service-oriented architectures	Schrjakin M., Menzel M., Meinel C.	2009	Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security		Application	SecurePipe, MessageConfidentiality		Yes	CIA + Authorisation	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Analysis, Design	N/A	Web Services
22	A pattern-driven security process for SOA applications	Delessy N.A., Fernandez E.B.	2008	Proceedings of the ACM Symposium on Applied Computing		Application			Yes	Confidentiality, Integrity	N/A	N/A	UML-like	Model driven, MDA	Example	Analysis, Design, Implementation	N/A	
23	A process model design and tool support for information assets access control using security patterns	Ratchakom M., Prompoon N.	2011	Promotings of the 2011 the Innovational Joint Conference on Computer Science and Arbano Emphasizing JASSE 2011		Application	RBAC	N/A	Yes	Confidentiality		N/A	UML Activity diagram to Process Model	N/A	N/A	While process of SAC-system development	Yes, but unclear	N/A
24	A qualitative analysis of software security patterns	Palitis I.T. Chalegoropinu A. Bepheniën G	2006	Computers and Security	25 5	Analysis			No	Availability	Unclear	N/A	UML	Unclear	Example	Analysis	N/A	N/A
25	A security engineering process for systems of systems using security patterns	Ruis JF, Rodolph C, Marta A, Arjona M.	2014	Sth Annual SSSS International Systems Conference, SysCon 2014 - Proceedings		Development methodology	security solution for systems of systems		Yes	Unclear	N/A	N/A	SPT,UML	N/A	N/A	Modeling	teal for act we frequency by property or security with tea	N/A
26	A security pattern-driven approach toward the automation of risk treatment in business processes	THEN THE R. P. BOOKEN, R. BOOKEN, P. S. BOOK	2013	Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing	189 AESC	Specification	Saladista Militaria, Saladista e 1993, Spilladista da carejad	N/A	No	Integrity, confidentiality (on the example)	Yes in ontology but a little	Yes (attribute and forces)	Proposed template	OPBUS framework	Example	Business process modeling	OPBUS framework exetnaion	Unclear
27	A Security Reference Architecture for cloud systems	Fernandez E.B., Monge R.	2014	ACM International Conference Proceeding Series		Application			Yes	Unclear	Misuse patterns and in metamodel	N/A	White Ages, source Agest as retended 1996.	Unclear	Example	Replanera lengua Anigo (rejeneracia) minusera	N/A	Cloud
28	A semantic based certification and access control approach using security patterns on SEAGENT	Tekbacak F., Tuglular T., Dikanelli O.	2008	20th International Conference on Enfluence Engineering and Knowledge Engineering. IEEE 2008		Application	typi kalustudu dyst fadhalas kalusty konst katala	N/A	N/A	containtally integrity automission correputation	N/A	N/A	Protocol degran for Schoolson, unknown for amenture	Secure Tropos, model driven design	Case study	Design	Malabel the Edward was at most arms design mate)	Multi-agent systems (MAS)
	A study of security architectural patterns	Boson Iris, Santone S. Farendar Matter E. Participe	2006	Proceedings - First International Conference on Australity Metabolity and Security, AMSS 2008	2006	Analysis		N/A	N/A		N/A	Security degree (L. Low M. Medium H. High)	UML class diagram		N/A	Any	N/A	N/A
30	A survey of security solutions for distributed publish/subscribe systems	Uzunov A.V.	2016	Computers and Security	61	Survey			N/A	Searney, bringing, Associability, Associability		N/A	N/A		N/A	Design	N/A	Distributed publish/subscribe systems
31		Ahmed N., Matulevicius R.	2013	Presentings - Marcalized Conference on Passarch Outlanges in Information Science		Classification, Catalog, Map	SRP1-5		N/A	Condentiality, integrity, availability	Some possible attacks are considered	N/A	BPMN	N/A	Example	Business process modeling	N/A	N/A
	A tool for managing evolving security requirements	Register 6, November F. Paul F. Tan F.E., Namelo, Na. 1	2012	Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing	107 LNBP	Application	Trusted path		N/A	Integrity (unclear but may be CIA)	Abuse the situation	N/A	The destination restrictions because of SMF includes	SeCMER, SI+, Problem Frames	Gene atudy (Mustavina Energia), separitanta hashahap	Requirements engineering evolution		N/A
33	A UML-based methodology for secure systems: The design stage	Personio EB, Begata T, Lamosio Perio MM.	2005	Prosesting of the International Welsting on Searchy in Internation Syrvans, MISSE 2005, in Surjection and ISSE 2005		Development methodology	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Relate attacks to use cases.	N/A	N/A		N/A	Any	N/A	N/A
	Abstract security patterns	Fernandoz E.B., Mashizahi H., Yoshisha N.	2008	PLoPOB - 15th Conference on Pattern Languages of Programs, Proceedings		Classification, Catalog, Map		N/A	Abstraction hierarchy, usage relationship	N/A	(Threat)	N/A	UML class diagram for relationship		N/A	Any	N/A	N/A
35	Abstract security patterns for requirements specification and analysis of secure systems	Fernandor Elli, Vashiska N. Washisaki H. Yador J.	2014	CIESS 2016 Proceedings of the 15th Beny-American Conference Software Engineering		Classification, Catalog, Map		N/A	Abstraction hierarchy, usage relationship	N/A	Threat (and regulation)	N/A		,	N/A	Requirements engineering analysis	N/A	N/A
36		Burnel P. El-Wassey P. Gress S. Li K.	2008	Promoting of the 2000 individuals for function for function for the 2000 individual for 2000 individual fo	2	Empirical and case study	XACML, its three variations	N/A	Combination of patterns	Confidentiality (and integrity, availability)	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	General State of the State of t	Design, deployment	N/A	Smart home
	An analysis of the security patterns landscape	Playmen T., Yahnut K., Standariata K., Jassen W.	2007	housing - XM XX7 Mariya: That increases Marina in Software Signaring for Sonse Syrves, MINEST		Survey		N/A	N/A	sentantially, identification and data integrity	N/A	Quality of pattern documentation	Document	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
38	An approach for security patterns application in component based models	Bousziz R, Kallel S, Coulette B.	2014	nadra Nilara Terapia Nasara Schallig albadas kalko Nilara Afficia Edifyera artikalia Nilara Badalisha d	ISIS LINCS PART 5	Application	RBAC	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	UML, ATL	Model driven, component facund (arquest retensions)	lass study (fluoresian fluoresia), esperiment (antalese	Design, implementation	Papyrus suite tool, ATL	N/A
39 40	An approach to model-based development of secure and reliable systems	Famous Ed, Marinel H, Northis B, Vertile B	2011	Proceedings of the 2011 distributional Conference on Availability, Polishility and Emority, AMEL 2011	51	Development methodology	Authorization, RBAC	N/A N/A	N/A N/A	Contaminate, integrity, materity, materity	Threats, misuses	NI / A	UML N/A	1	N/A N/A	Any	N/A	N/A
40	An architecture for secure ambient intelligence environments	Secret Seat Seats Separate Printer Secretary	2009	Advances in Soft Computing	JI	Dotostic:	IN/ A	N/A N/A	N/A	N/A N/A	N/A N/A	N/A N/A			IN/ A	Development-time, run-time		N/A
41	An architecture-centric approach to detecting security patterns in software	Bunke M., Sohr K.	2009	nadra Nilecco Statigate Nascos (schallig adhaba karkos Nilecco Addiest Statigaces autombos Nilecco Restrictiva	6542 LNCS	Detection	Single Access Point	N/A N/A	N/A N/A	N/A N/A		N/A N/A	UML. OCL	Any	Sans marker (browning partners in quar assets applications)	Maintenance, evolution	a reverse engineering tool-suite Bashaus	N/A N/A
43	An aspect-oriented approach for software security hardening: From design to implementation	Boles S. Sell St. Woods Serv Stable S. Baylo Served S.		Computers and Security	27 42433	Application Application	Secure Connection	N/A	N/A	IN/ A	IN/ A	N/A	OIVIL, OUL	Model driver, aspect-orientation	Case study, experiment	Design, implementation	AspectC++	N/A
44	An aspect-oriented approach for the systematic security hardening of code	Miscrael A., Lauerditre MA., Debbabi M.	2012	CEUR Workshop Proceedings	∠ / 42433	Application	RBAC	N/A	No N/A		(Vulnerability and attack)	N/A	Problem Frame	лпу	Case study, experiment	implementation	N/A	N/A
45	An aspect-oriented approach to relating security requirements and access control	Market A, Tar TT, Ya Y, Hand M, Sandah B	2008	OEUR Workshop Proceedings	1	Verification	NDAO	11/ /	INO IN/ 74	Confidentiality -> Unclear?	11/ //	N/A	Problem Frame	Any	Sans study (Australia Europia) proper least a least	Design	N/A	N/A
46	An attack scenario based approach for software security testing at design stage	He K., Feng Z., Li X.	2013	Proceedings - International Symposium on Computer Science and Computational Technology, SICSCT 2008		V CI III CALIOII	RBAC	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	UML	SCRIP	Example	Doolgii	ATL	N/A
47	An engineering process for security patterns application in component based models	pousza R, Kallel S, Goulette B.	2015	Presentings of the Workshop or Enabling Technologies behaviorates for Calabratica Enterprises, MESCE	235	Development methodology Empirical and case study	5/ .0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	UML	BPM	Case Study	?	N/A	BPM
48	An experence report or improving business process compliance using security risk-oriented patterns. An explorations comparison of requirity patterns and taction to the comparison of requirity patterns and taction to the comparison of requirity patterns and taction to the comparison of requirity patterns.	Aukus ML., Matulevičius R.	2014	Lecture reces in Business Information Processing	200	Analysis	Securing data from much berieved assesses etc.	13//1	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	architectural tactics	Cusc Otduy	N/A	N/A	N/A
49	An ontological interface for coffusive developers to select	men, reservizorio il seullo II, fondazi III.	2008	cannot are to reasonings of the 15th Benn-American Conference Belower Engineering		Selection	have been seen and arrange of	N/A	N/A	N/A	, / \	N/A	OWL		N/A	design	N/A	N/A
50	An ontology-based approach to security pattern selection	Guan H. Yang H. Warv I	2016	International Journal of Automation and Committee	13 2	Selection	versenon and representation	N/A	N/A	.,,,,	STRIDE	N/A	OWL		N/A	Architecture design	security natham search review	N/A
51	An operational model and language support for securing XML documents	Hwang GH., Chang TK		Computers and Security	23 6	Application		N/A	N/A	Confidentiality	information disclosure	N/A	security description language		N/A	operation	N/A	XML
52		Orio R. Garota J., Fernándos-Medina S.	2011	Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing	83 LNBBP	Survey		N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A		N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
53		Li T., Horkoff J., Mylopoulos J.	2015	Section Nation is Scripped National Scripture Sections And Section Additional Subsection National Sections (Section Section Se	9013	Analysis		N/A	N/A	N/A								

Column	55 Applying security pattern 56 Applying security pattern 57 Architectural risk analys 58 ASE A comprehensive pat 59 Attack surface reduction 60 Automated verific 62 Behavioral singletons to 63 Best-pusation patterns and t 64 Building a security 65 Building a security 67 Challenges for 67 Challenges for 69 Classifying 70 Composing Patte 71 Conformation security 72 Composing Patte 73 Context—aware 74 C-SCRIP: Collabora 75 Defining re-usable com 77 Defining security 78 Defining viewpoin 79 Designing security 80 Developing a security 81 Development of a 82 Do security pattern 83 Dose organizing sec	schique for security requirements verification based on security patterns ms for component based applications using UML profile	Changadwech C., Prorepoon N. Bouaziz R., Coulette B.	2016 Lecture Notes in Engineering and Computer Science	1	Verification	reference monitor	N/A	N/A	N/A						0	N/A	N/A
Application	56 Applying security pattern 57 Architectural risk analys 58 ASE A comprehensive pat 59 Attack surface reduction 60 Automated verificio 61 Automated verificio 62 Beleviorral singletons to 63 Best-practice patterns and to 64 Building a security 65 Building secure sy 67 Challenges for 68 Chassifying 70 Composing Patte 71 Conformation chadding of 72 Composing Patte 71 Conformation chadding of 72 Composing Patte 73 Context—aware 74 Context—aware 75 Defining re-unable com 77 Defining security a 78 Defining re-unable com 77 Defining security a 80 Developing a security p 81 Development of a 82 Do security p 83 Dose organizing sec		Changedwech C., Prompoon N. Bouaziz R., Coulette B.	2012				_								0	11/ /	
State Stat	57 Architectural risk analys 58 ASE A comprehensive pair 59 Attack surface reduction 60 Automated verifice 61 Automated verifice 62 sehavioral singletons to 63 sets practice patterns and 64 Building a security 65 shaldes high excernis assert 66 Building secure sy 67 Challenges for 68 Characterizations am 69 Classifying 70 Composing Patt 71 Conformance checking of 72 concecting anoutry require 73 Context—aware 74 C-SCRIP: Collabor 75 busing with security require 76 Defining re-unable com 77 Defining security a 78 Defining viewpoin 79 Designing secure 80 Developing a security 81 Development of a 82 Do security p 83 Does organizing sec		Bouaziz R., Goulette B.			Application	active replication						IIMI protila	N/A I	Caca etudy	Design	N/A	
\$6 \$	58 ASE A comprehensive pat 59 Attack surface reduction 60 Automated verific 62 Behavioral singletons to 63 auto-practice patterns and 64 Building a socurity 65 Building a socurity 67 Challenges for 68 Characterizations and 69 Classifying 70 Composing Patt 71 Conformance deciding of 72 Connecting security require 73 Context—aware 74 C-SCRIP: Collabor- 75 Building security and 76 Defining re-trashe com 77 Defining security an 78 Defining viewpoin 79 Designing security 79 Designing security 80 Development of a 81 Development of a 82 Do security p 83 Does organizing sec	ysis of software systems based on security patterns			5 2	Varification	名 粉	_								0		
	59 Attack surface reduction 60 Assembled resulting service white 61 Automated verific 62 Behavioral singletons to 63 Best-preaction patterns at 16 64 Building a security 65 Building secure system 66 Building secure system 67 Challenges for 68 Characterizations and 69 Classifying 70 Composing Patt 71 Conformance behavior 72 Composing Patt 73 Context-aware 74 C-SCRIP: Collabor 75 Building security require 76 Defining security at 16 77 Defining security at 17 78 Defining security at 17 79 Designing security 79 Designing security 70 Developing a security 71 Development of a 17 72 Do Security p 73 Dose sorganizing sec	attern-driven security methodology for distributed systems				Verification	24											
60	Automated searchy service archive		Usunov AV, Fernandro ESL, Fallerer K.		71	Application	DRAC ARAC				,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,	,						
State Continue to the continue to the transport Continue to the continue to the transport Continue to the continue to	61 Automated verific 62 Behavioral singletons to 63 Best-practice patterns and t 64 Building a security 65 Building a security 66 Building secure symmetric patterns and t 67 Challenges for 68 Characterizations and 69 Classifying 70 Composing Patte 71 Commons sheeking of 72 Commons sheeking of 73 Context—aware 74 C-SCRIP: Collabora 75 Dealing with security require 76 Defining re-unable com 77 Defining security a 78 Defining re-unable com 79 Designing secure 80 Developing a security 81 Development of a 82 Do security p 83 Does organizing sec	ion for web services based on authorization patterns	Stringer R. Schiller J., Vagler M., Klamb S.				RBAC, ABAC		140				OWL		-	Ů		
Comparison	62 Behavioral singletons to 63 Best-practice patterns and 64 Building a security 65 Building secure sy 67 Challenges for 68 Chassifying 70 Composing Patte 71 Composing Patte 71 Composing Patte 72 Composing Patte 73 Context—aware 74 C-SCRIP: Collabor 75 Desling with security require 76 Defining re-unable com 77 Defining security a 80 Developing a security 81 Development of a 82 Do security p 83 Dose organizing sec	chestration for the identity management in Web Service based systems	Wareshofsky R, Mercall M, Meinel C.		52 3		Identification and authentication		No.				tern (SML use same t applient design model)		-			
63	63 Best-precisio patterns and 1 64 Building a security 65 before the horizontal security 67 Challenges for 68 Characterizations and 69 Classifying 70 Composing Patte 71 Conformation shading of 72 Concepts security require 73 Context—aware 74 C-SCRIP: Collabor 75 being security as 6 Defining re-unable com 77 Defining security a 78 Defining viewpoin 79 Designing security a 60 Developing a security 78 Developing a security 79 Designing sec	cation or security pattern compositions	Dong J., Peng T., Zhao Y.		02 0		cingleton											
64 No.	64 Building a security 65 Building secure system 66 Building secure system 67 Challenges for 68 Characterizations and 69 Classifying 70 Composing Patt 71 Conformance checking of 72 Connecting aboutly require 73 Context—aware 74 C-SCRIP: Collabor 75 Building with security require 76 Defining security and 77 Defining security and 78 Defining viewpoin 79 Designing security 80 Developing a security and 81 Development of a 82 Do security p 83 Dose organizing sec	o consistently handle global states of security patterns	Quessan LA, Krammer FA, Hermann P.		7979 LNCS		Siligietori		INO							_		
Edit	65 Building legit enterrors servers. 66 Building secure system. 67 Challenges for 68 Characterizations and 69 Classifying 70 Composing Patte 71 Conformance checking of 72 Convexting security requires 73 Context—aware 74 C—SCRIP: Collabort 75 Desling with security requires 76 Defining security at 78 Defining viewpoin 79 Designing security at 78 Developing a security pattern 81 Development of a 82 Do security p 83 Does organizing security at 84 Early security patterns 4 auto-	d tool support for configuring secure web services messaging	Tatsubori M., Imemura T., Nekamura Y.	-	21 2	Application	white and the state of the state of	NONE	enally yes, however of the use of same implicaptions							,		
	66 Building secure sys 67 Challenges for 68 Characterizations and 69 Classifying 70 Composing Patt 71 Conformance bedseling of 72 Connecting security require 73 Context—aware 74 C-SCRIP. Collabor, 75 Dealing with security read 76 Defining re-usable con 77 Defining security as 78 Defining viewpoin 79 Designing security as 80 Developing a security path 81 Developement of a 82 Do security p 83 Does organizing sec	y reference architecture for cloud systems	Pimba D		21 2	Development methodology	C	None	Yes, misuse to security		-					Design	None	
For Charlesges for a formal formassest for pretures Baryley 1 2014	67 Challenges for 68 Characterizations and 69 Classifying 70 Composing Patt 71 Conformance checking of 72 Courseling security require 73 Context—aware 74 C-SCRIP: Collabora 75 Dealing with security require 76 Defining re-usable com 77 Defining security at 78 Defining re-usable com 77 Designing secure 80 Developing a security at 81 Development of a 82 Dos security patterns 84 Early security patterns 84 Early security patterns 85 Desos organizing secure	e applications using security patterns for capability-based platforms				Development methodology	Secure Logger									Design and Implementation	None	
Secretification None Non	68 Characterizations and 69 Classifying 70 Composing Patt 71 Conformance obesiding of 72 Convecting arounds require 73 Conformance obesiding of 74 Co-SCRIP_Collabor 75 Dealing with security require 76 Defining re-usable con 77 Defining security and 78 Defining security and 79 Designing security and 80 Development of a 81 Development of a 82 Do security p 83 Does organizing sec					Apalycic	Authorization, Reference Monitor, Log World		,							Decign		·
66 Classifying security patterns 2008 2015	69 Classifying 70 Composing Pattu 71 conformance obesides of 72 concentre accurate requirem 73 Context—aware 74 c-script Collabor 75 basing with scorriv requirem 76 Defining re-usable con 77 Defining security an 78 Defining security an 79 Designing security an 80 Developing a security of 81 Development of a 82 Do security ty 83 Does organizing sec		Dayley I.				ethorisel pathetis and an parametric privileges, and sension			The second second			_					-
The contract States of S	70 Composing Patter 71 Conformance checking of 72 Connecting according resulter 73 Context—aware 74 Conscription 75 Defining remusable com 77 Defining remusable com 77 Defining security an 78 Defining security an 79 Designing secure 80 Developing a security 81 Development of a 82 Do security ty 83 Does organizing sec	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	Slavin R., Shen H., Niu J.															
71	71 Conformance checking of 72 Conformance checking of 72 Contexts—ware 73 Context—aware 74 C-SCRIP-Collabor; 75 Dealing with security and 75 Dealing with security and 76 Defining re-usable com 77 Defining security at 78 Defining security at 78 Designing secures 80 Development security at 79 Development of a 80 Development of a 82 Do security p 83 Does organizing security at 84 Early security patterns A soft		February R. Bartonic R. Turkinic R. Balcal, Fabruary 1		4976 LNCS												None	
72	72	terns to Construct Secure Systems	Rinda P., Zhu L., Bass L., Kaz I., Renves S.		-+											Design, Test	terrone nee, free; berion layers (MI), bening	NOT specified
73 Contract waver Security-Servations deployment in Experiment process. 2015 10 1 N/A N/A N/A	73 Context-aware 74 C-SCRIP: Collabor; 75 Desiring with security resi 76 Defining re-usable com 77 Defining security at 78 Defining viewpoin 79 Designing secure \$ 80 Developing a security at 81 Development of a 82 Do security p	of single access point pattern in JAAS using codecharts	Alzahrani AA.H, Edan A.H, Yafi M.Z.		-+	Specification	Single Access point pattern (SAP)	ivone								Design, Implementation		NI / A
77 10 10 10 10 10 10 10	74 C-SCRIP: Collabor; 75 Dealing with security results according to the country results com 77 Defining revusable com 78 Defining viewpoin 79 Designing secure? 80 Developing a security at 81 Development of a 82 Do security at 83 Does organizing sec		Schmidt H., Jürjens J.		6741 LNCS	Development methodology	Symmetric Encryptor Decopptor pullars		,	ΟI		OVI		IN/ A		analysis and architecture design	UNILSEC	IN/ A
75	75 balars with security required from the following re-usable com 77 befining security at 78 befining security at 78 befining security at 79 besigning secure \$0 besigning security at 10 besigning security at 10 besigning security at 10 besigning security at 10 besigning security between \$10 besigning security between \$10 besigning security between \$10 besigning security \$10 besigning sec		Our trapp NF, Name of F, Sa Sha SF, Strateur P.		10 1	Application	Dataeropytion pattern, authoritization	NI / A		NI /A	NI / A	NI / A						
The contract of the contract	76 Defining re-usable com 77 Defining security at 78 Defining viewpoin 79 Designing secure S 80 Developing a security p 81 Development of a 82 Do security p 83 Does organizing sec		Bouaziz R, Krichen F, Coulette B.		10 1	Development methodology										the whole process	code generation support	
77 Entiring sensity interface and patterns 2006 20	77 Defining security at 78 Defining viewpoin 79 Designing secure 8 Developing a security p 81 Development of a 82 Do security p 83 Does organizing sec		Li T., Horkoff J.		HH INCS	Development methodology							goal modeling				- g p	,
78 Designal security descriptions from security grateries 2006	78 Defining viewpoin 79 Designing secure S 80 Developing a security B 11 Development of a 82 Do security p 83 Does organizing sec 84 Lark security patterns A color		Tian K, Cooper KM.L, Feng K, Yang Y.		5333	Development methodology							NI / A					
Position Continue	79 Designing secure S 80 Developing a security p 81 Development of a 82 Do security p 83 Does organizing sec 84 Early security patterns. A solid		Posses Inti. Suname S. Famoutor Matrick, Participa		AND LINES PART 3								-					
80 Descriptions outside statement of the	80 Developing a security p 81 Development of a 82 Do security p 83 Does organizing sec 84 Early security patterns A colin		Process Intil, Summer St. Farmanter Mathews St. Photocols.			Specification	N/A	N/A										,
81 Development of applications based on security patterns really help designers? 2015	81 Development of a 82 Do security p 83 Does organizing sec 84 Early security patterns: A colle	SCADA systems using security patterns	Fernandez E.B., Lamondo-Petrie M.M.			Development methodology	Mills a facilities higher a floridon from \$1 accord			all						, ,		
R2 Do security patterns really help designers?	82 Do security p 83 Does organizing sec 84 Early security patterns: A colle	patterns repository for secure applications design				Knowledge base and repository									not yet			N/A
8.8	83 Does organizing sec 84 Early security patterns: A colle		Secured Astal Materia West Assessment Supplicati		4	Development methodology				not mentioned	not mentioned				case study (prototype development)			minimi intelligence (content mans againstions)
Section Sect	84 Early security patterns: A colle		Yskout K, Scandarlato R, Joseen M.		- 1	Empirical and case study	26 patten catalog (M) encrypted clorage)	N/A	yes		A. / A				•	design		
85 Executive security regular walvas with natures for uniformatic of any facilities security in the closed companding environment. Mathew G. 2012 bit 1855 colleges of the close of companding environment through misses activities. 87 Eliciting security patterns into a domain model. 88 Embedding security patterns into a domain model. 89 Enforcing a security patterns into a domain model. 90 Enforcing a security patterns into a domain model. 90 Enforcing a security patterns into a domain model. 90 Enforcing a security patterns into a domain model. 90 Enforcing a security patterns into a domain model. 90 Enforcing a security patterns into a domain model. 90 Enforcing a security patterns into a domain model. 90 Enforcing a security patterns into a domain model. 90 Enforcing a security patterns into a domain model. 90 Enforcing a security patterns into a domain model. 90 Enforcing a security patterns into a domain model. 90 Enforcing a security patterns into a domain model. 90 Enforcing a security patterns into a domain model. 90 Enforcing a security patterns into a domain model. 90 Enforcing a security patterns into a domain model. 90 Enforcing a security patterns into a domain model. 90 Enforcing a security patterns into a domain model. 90 Enforcing a security pattern in stake-includer goal models. 90 Enforcing a security pattern in stake-includer goal models. 90 Enforcing a security pattern in stake-includer goal models. 90 Enforcing security patterns in thomas units a security pattern in stake-includer goal models. 90 Enforcing a security pattern in stake-includer goal models. 90 Enforcing security patterns in stake-includer goal models. 90 Enforcing security patterns. 90		ecurity patterns focus architectural choices?	Yskout K, Scandariato R, Joseen W.			Empirical and case study	N1 / A	N1 / A	perfective to the Aspendantess arming accompanion polarisal						•	architectural design and detailed design		
86		election of constraints to describe regulatory security requirements	Gandhi R.A., Rahmani M.			•		N/A										
87 Eliciting security patterns in stakeholder goal models		act analysis with patterns for software enhancement	Okubo T., Kaiya H., Yoshioka N.				anti CSRF pattern		,	,								
88 Embedding security patterns into a domain model 2009			Mathew G.				turi ya yahin, sahat bartusi salasi sangan sangan hasa	improperly configured redirector		Confidentiality						Design		
89 Enforcing a security pattern in stakeholder goal models 2008			Braz F.A., Fernandez E.B., VanHütt M.			Verification	as examples, REAC, event logging	illegal money transferring		containing in priy auditity and accountity				0,	-	Requirements, Analysis		
90 Enforcing security in smart home using security patterns are some to the production of the producti		curity patterns into a domain model	Solinas M., Fernandro E.B., Antonelli L.			Development methodology	Authorization pattern	N/A										-
91 Expressing Security into Distributed Systems A Survey of Methodologies — 1 to 1 and 1		,,	N.Y. Kaparis, Manhadrin, Xiang Y. Hu Z. Yashinka N				RBAC (as an example)	N/A(only attack scinario)								_		
92 Enhancing model driven security through pattern refinement techniques 93 Insurant stands of the security pattern of the minute of the programment of the minute of the programment of the minute of	_ ,	y in smart homes using security patterns	Rhoury P.E., Butnel P., Giroux S., Li K.							Confidentiality								
93 Improve and sound of the MTA No. 100 Improved the Confidential Security patterns and sound of the MTA no. 100 Improved the Security patterns and sound of the Security patterns an		nto Distributed Systems: A Survey of Methodologies	Usunov AV, Fernandry ES, Fallerer K.		18 20	Survey		_		Confidentiality, integrity and availability					-			N/A
94 Enterprise security pattern: A model-driven erchitecture instance 95 Enterprise security pattern: A new type of security patterns with preventance of security patterns with preventa		en security through pattern refinement techniques	Kett R., Garder M., Breu R., Felderer M.		7540 LNCS	Development methodology												
95 Enterprise socially pattern: A new type of sociality pattern: A new type of sociality patterns with premiorisms of stack and sociality patterns in the full patterns with premiorisms of stack and sociality patterns in the full patterns in		irements construction from ESRMG grammar based on security patterns	Superporn K., Promposon N., Rejhangsaslan T.															
96 Evaluating the implications of attack and security patterns with premortame Fally S, Parkin S, Liyk J. 2014 Comment and software Technology 54 9 Octoberguest reductions of attack and security prists and security patterns S and S CAIRIS Example (webinos) Design CAIRIS tool N/A		pattern: A model-driven architecture instance	Marchan S. Naci March Associated M. Secondar Medicals	2014 Computer Standards and Interfaces		Application	secure SaaS		•	Confidentiality	-							
97 Estatement of the Peter-Pasted method for Successful Foliation of with application associately risks and secure design patterns of the Successful Foliation of the MTA architecture: The impact of security in the analysis of the model of the MTA architecture: The impact of security in the analysis of the model of the MTA architecture: The impact of security in the analysis of the model of the MTA architecture: The impact of security in the analysis of the model of the MTA architecture: The impact of security in the analysis of the model of the MTA architecture: The impact of security in the analysis of the model of the MTA architecture: The impact of security in the analysis of the model of the MTA architecture: The impact of security in the analysis of the MTA architecture: The impact of security in the analysis of the MTA architecture: The impact of security in the analysis of the MTA architecture: The impact of security in the analysis of the MTA architecture: The impact of security in the analysis of the MTA architecture: The impact of security in the analysis of the MTA architecture: The impact of security in the analysis of the MTA architecture: The impact of security in the analysis of the MTA architecture: The impact of security in the analysis of the MTA architecture: The impact of security in the analysis of the MTA architecture in the registration of t		ty pattern: A new type of security pattern	Marchan Calarina Charles (Charles W. boson March	·	7 11	Development methodology	MINISTERNAL AND TO APPRILITED SERVINGS	N/A		Confidentiality, integrity and availability								
98 Evaluation of web application security risks and secure design patterns Dalai A.K. Jens S.K. 2011 A.M. International Conference Proceeding Series Cassification, Claring, Mp N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/		tions of attack and security patterns with premortems	Faily S., Parkin S., Lyle J.		_	Analysis	Context Policy Management	Test Footprinting attack pattern			,			CAIRIS	Example (webinos)	_		
99 Evolution of the MTA architecture: The impact of security Hafit M. Johnson RE. 2008 Software - Practice and Experience 38 15 Empirical and case study N/A no Confidentiality N/A N/A N/A UML N/A N/A design. Analysis N/A N/A N/A 101 Extended software architecture based on security patterns Robinson P. 2007 Specification N/A		ed method for Secure Development (PbSD): A controlled experiment	Abramov J., Sturm A., Shoval P.		54 9	Development methodology				Confidentiality				esperantes hypothes handlessed the May 1999 Theresed.	y (case study, controlled experiment)	_		
100 Extended software architecture based on security patterns Security patterns Robinson P. 2007 Specification N/A		olication security risks and secure design patterns	Dalai A.K., Jena S.K.							Confidentiality, Integrity, availability								
101 Extended software architecture based on security patterns Successfully patterns Robinson P. 2007 Specification N/A		MTA architecture: The impact of security	Hafiz M., Johnson R.E.		38 15	Empirical and case study												
102 Extensible security patterns Robinson P. 2007 Specification N/A N/A no N/A formal modeling N/A no no no		rity issues in public sector inter-organizational collaboration	Van Veerstra A.F., Ramilli M.		6646 LNCS	Empirical and case study		,			,	,		,			,	,
					21 2					,					, . , .			
$\begin{bmatrix} 1 & 102 \end{bmatrix} = 1 & 102 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} $		e security patterns	Robinson P.			Specification					_	-	formal modeling	N/A	no	in the Saura, code generation and accommend confination	no	
		of TPM technologies using the serenity framework	Muñoz A., Maña A.	2011	6906 LNCS	Development methodology	N/A	N/A		N/A		N/A	Digital modeling notation like sequence slagram		no	development and at run time	no	TPM
104 Finding security bugs in with applications using a catalog of security bugs in which applications using a catalog of security bugs in the catalog of security bugs i			Near J.P., Jackson D.		***	Verification									Yes	static check	SPACE(Security Pattern Checker)	_
105 Instruction to understand the un		web applications using a catalog of access control patterns					1	NI/A	V	NI / A	n 0	NI / A	ctructured	N/A	Yes	?	Yes	?
106 From security patterns to implementation using Petri nets Horvath V. Dorges T. 2008 Specification N/A N/A no N/A no N/A petri nets model driven dev. no design implication N/A multi-agent system no no no no no no no n		web applications using a catalog of access control patterns security standards storage and retrieval using security patterns	Ruamjinda P., Prompoon N.			Selection			res	IN/ A		,	Structureu	14//1	100			
107 Growing a pattern language (for security) with American Scheme 2012 on MA no N/A no N/A no N/A			Ruamjinda P., Prompoon N. Horvath V., Dörges T.	2008 Proceedings - International Conference on Software Engineering SESSCOOR					no	N/A => eavesdrop	no	N/A	petri nets	model driven dev.		design=implimentation	Yes	
	108 Identification and implementation o		Ruamjinda P., Prompoon N. Horvath V., Dörges T. Hafu M., Adamczyk P., Johnson R.	Proceedings - Incorrectional Conference on Software Engineering 95550001			Information Secrety, Secure Communication	N/A	no Yes	N/A => eavesdrop	no	N/A	petri nets	model driven dev.	no	design-implimentation	Yes	

109 Identifying and inclamentation security catterns for a dependable security case - From security catterns to D-case	Patu V Yamamoto S	2013			Detection	no	no	ves	l	ves	no	D-Case diagram	no	no		no	no
100 identifying and implementing ascurity patterns for a dependable ascurity case - From security patterns to D-case 110 implementation support of security design patterns, using test templates.	Patu V., Yamamoto S.		Information (Switzerland)	7 2	Verification	110	no	no	N/A	no	no	UML. OCL	110	Yes	requirement, design, implementation	Yes	no
Implementation support of security design patterns using test templates 111 Improving security design patterns with aspect-oriented strategies	Selfment Belliet I Seemed State Colored Selfment	2012		/ 2	Application	Recognitively and the pathon 1888 proved oping the pathon	no	no	N/A	no	N/A (for quality of security)	UML, OCL	aspect oriented	Yes (modularity)	requestment, design, implementation, testing	no	no
112 Improving security design patterns with aspect-oriented strategies 112 Improving the classification of security patterns	Edge C., Mitropoulos F.	2009				adheritation enforcer, authorisation enforcer	no	Yes	N/A	no	N/A (for quality of security)	UML	no	Yes example	analysis, design	no	no
110	Netter M. Pernul G.	2009			Application Application		no	Yes	IN/ A	no	no		n/a	no	, , ,	no	no
113 Integrating security patterns into the electronic invoicing process 114 Integrating security patterns with security requirements analysis using contextual soul models	Netter M., Pernul G.	2014		197	Application		110	no	integrity, confidentiallity	no	no		n/a	no => example	requirement	Yes, the tool "MUSER" is used	no
Integrating security patterns with security requirements analysis using contextual goal models 115 Management patterns for network resilience: Design and verification of policy configuration,	Li T., Horkoff J., Mylopoulos J.	2014	Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing	197	Specification	Woundry params as introducionistantico figuras param	N/A		Availability	DDoS	N/A		N/A	Example	requirement	N/A	110
440	Scharfer-File A, Smith P, Martin A, Hambler S.	2014	Cyberpatterns: Unifying Design Patterns with Security and Attack Patterns		Verification	High-Volume Traffic Challenge	IN/ A	Yes (conflict among policies)	N/A	no	IN/ A	UML	no	no	design	no	Network policy configuration
110 Measuring the level of security introduced by security patterns 117 Model checking security pattern compositions	Famorair Edi, Walting H., Nathida N., Varido N.	2010	ARES 2010 - 5th International Conference on Anabability, Reliability, and Security			allered to an other to a complete control, and an appropriate account	misser politer, threat politers, allesh politers	•	n/a			UNIL		no	design	Yes	
110	Dong J., Peng T., Zhao Y	2010	Proceedings - International Conference on Quality Software		Verification Application	vener pipe petiern, authentication enfancer patien.	no no	no no	confidentiality	no no	no no	UML	modle checker	ves	_	ATL	no no
118 Model-driven security patterns application based on dependences among patterns 119 Model-driven security with a system of aspect-oriented security design patterns	Minns Y, Walland N, Februar Y, Male A, Yallala N	2014			Application		no	no	n/a	no	no			no	design, implementation	no	no
100	Nguyen P.H., Klein J., Le Traon Y.	_	ACM International Conference Proceeding Series CEUR Workshop Proceedings			Authenticator		no	n/a		no		n/a	no		no	no
120 Modeling and applying security patterns using contextual goal models 121 Modeling and performance analysis for security aspects	Li T., Mylopoulos J.	2006		61 1	Application	Authenticator	no	no	п/ а	no no	no	UNIL		ves	design, requirement	110	no
400	Dai L., Cooper K.	2011	Science of Computer Programming	01 1	Analysis	Marija adadada (saga Mkapia) Miladaja ad		no	ringity softentially (i – asterization paten)	1	no	No. That Purse Burg Andyo Terroschi Repla Artes	aspect-oriented	,	design, analysis design	Drotoro	
0 01	Asnar Y., Paja E., Mylopoulos J.	2009	liefjing Danue Xueluus (Zeun Kenue Ban)/Asia Inimilianun Naturalum Driversilatin Pelitensis.		Specification		no		non-repudiation	no		Tropic Dr. ONL-OI, SWIE, SPANOI, SOWIE.	no	yes	uesign	Protege	no
123 Modeling misuse patterns 124 Modeling secure systems using an agent-oriented approach and security patterns	Fernandoù E.B., Yeshioke N., Washioski H.	2009		2	Specification	no	no	Yes	availability	yes	no no	Misuse Pattern Templates	no	no	During design and after attacks have happened	no	no
	Mouratids H., Weiss M., Giorgini P.			3	Application	Aprily hard April Advisor States Arms Society		yes	integrity, availability, privacy	no	rio	Tropos	agent-winsted software engineering (ADSE)	yes	requirements analysis, antihitestual design	no	no
125 Modelling security patterns using NFR analysis 126 Moving from requirements to design confronting security issues: A case study	Weiss M.	2006	Integrating Security and Software Engineering Advances and Future Visions	_	Specification	Stream (Single) Assess Point, Cheat Point, Rate	no	yes	accordability confidentiality integrity availability	no	performance, cost, maintainability, scability	Goal-oriented Requirement Language	no	no	requirement, design	no	no
107	Habida E.T., Chalugeorgiou A., Stephanides G.			20 42465	Development methodology		ne (but several returne "sames" are strase)	no	confidentiality, integrity	yes	no	no	no	no	design	no Aspect I	no
400	Mourad A., Otrok H., Baajour L.		,	∠U 42465	Application	Ger Authentination, Service Access Central (MSAC)	no	no	no	no	no	ndred language, DM, (with no convenie example)	ACP (Aspect-Oriented Programming)	experiment	design, development, deployment	AspectJ	no
128 On building secure SCADA systems using security patterns	Format Ed. No. J. Lances Paris Mill. Day 1	2009			Development methodology		no	no	no	yes	no	WK (south sies dayum and sequence dayum)	no	no	design	no	no
129 On the description of software security patterns	Bunke M.	2014		24 4	Specification	no	no	no	no	no	no	natural language	no	no	N/A all	no	no
130 Organizing security patterns	Hafiz M., Adamczyk P., Johnson R.E.		IEEE Software	24 4	Empirical and case study			yes	confidentiality, integrity, availability				no	no		no	no
131 Pattern qualifications and examples of next-generation agile system-security strategies	Dove R.	2010		_	Classification, Catalog, Map	Harisonial Mone Transfer, Box To Processor	no	no	no	no	no		no	no	N/A	no	no
132 Pattern-based security requirements derivation from secure tropos models	Rrenja A., Matulevičius R	2015	Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing	235	Analysis		no	no	confidentiality, integrity, availability	yes	no	Server Trapes, MAET Heavily, their makes Server Trapes!		printers (Minings, Chr)-162 viril		no	no
133 Patterns and pattern diagrams for access control	Fernandez E.B., Perrui G., Lamonio-Petrio Mili	2008	sades hites a finished Name including wheeler backer Miles of Afford Hallyana actualists Miles of Madelladard	HES LINCS	Specification		no	yes	no	no	no	pattern dagrams (priginal), UML	MDD (Model-Driven Development)	no	design	no	no
134 Patterns for security and privacy in cloud ecosystems	Fernandeo E.B., Yashiska N., Washisaki H.	. ###	Indimensional Metatra on Existing Security and Privary Requirements Engineering EUPM 2015 - Proceedings		Development methodology		N/A	no => partially yes	confidentiality and integrity		N/A		N/A	? No	Design	N/A	N/A => cloud-based ecosystem
135 Patterns transform architectures	Hafiz M., Adamczyk P., Johnson R.	###	Proceedings - No Merting SEE-01P Conference on Software Architecture, NECIA 2011		Application	securiy pattern	テーブルにて分類	no	confidentiality, availability, integrity	,	N/A		N/A	no	development and at run time	N/A	N/A
136 Practical policy patterns	Thomsen D.		COSASPY11 - Precedings of the 14 AGM Conference on Data and Application Sensity and Privacy		Analysis	access control		no	N/A	no	N/A	,	N/A	no	design	N/A	N/A
137 Preliminary evaluation of a software security learning environment	Hazeyama A., Saito M.	###	Studies in Computational Intelligence	578	Knowledge base and repository	N/A	Attack patterns	Yes	N/A	,	N/A		N/A	no	Analysis, design		N/A
138 Preventing and unifying threats in cyberphysical systems	Fernandez E.B.		Proceedings of SEE International Symposium on High Assurance Systems Engineering	S16-Marsh	Analysis	Thread model	threat	no	Not specified		N/A		N/A	no	N/A	N/A	N/A
139 Privacy patterns for online interactions	Removally G. Angleti A. Pleng J. Grace LF. Fladman B.	###	PLIP 2006 - PLIP Patters Languages of Programs 2006 Conference Proceedings		Analysis	registration, input personal information	N/A	no	confidentiality, availability, integrity	N/A	N/A	,	N/A	no	N/A	N/A	N/A
140 Problem-oriented security patterns for requirements engineering	Alebrahim A., Heisel M	ı. ###	ACM International Conference Proceeding Series	e-mayora	Application	N/A	problem pattern	no	Not specified	1	N/A		n/a	no)		N/A
141 Quantitative evaluation of systems with security patterns using a fuzzy approach	Habida S.T., Chalageorgicu A., Stepheniëra G.	. ###	narion Nations Scriptor Nations (consider patients having National Additional Additional Additional National Additional National Additional National Nationa	ETT LINCE - I	Verification		attack pattern (STRIDE)	no	confidentiality, availability, integrity	no	Fuzzy methodology	N/A	N/A	STRIDE ,examination	N/A	N/A	N/A
142 Paulining model driven seasority for inter-programminal annihilans with NEV-CES, and USA, 22 bi-imping each services, seasority and USB, improbe	Hafner M., Breu R.		harins Natura Scriptor Natura (coloding administration Natura AdMinistrations activates Natura Mandella Natura	712 LNCS	Application	Web services Unclear	no	no	Continuing Imaging Northquakton		N/A	Mit had noting the boson florography benefits beyon.	N/A Model driven architecture	no	N/A	N/A	N/A, Web Service
Refining the pattern-based reference model for electronic invoices by incorporating threats	Netter M., Fernandez E.B., Pernul G	a ###	ARES 2010 - Str International Conference on Analytisty, Reliability, and Security		Development methodology	com parters become differential	misuse	no	artischtis autotis, sieptis artestots an opeletos accedente		N/A		N/A	no	Analysis		N/A
144 Reusable formal models for secure software architectures	Heyman T., Scandariato R., Joosen W.	« ###	Francisy of the BH ANT Belong Bulleton on Authors the Orders and Bulleton on Authors Anthonics SIGNA STATES	\perp	Specification		no	no	accountability	no	N/A		N/A	feasibility, usability, correctness,	analysis<+designer>	N/A	N/A
145 Revisiting architectural tactics for security	Fernander E.E., Ratuellie H., Probace Garcie G	. ###	nedes Niles is Supple Name (middle alledes halles Niles Affice Hollyway actualists Niles Machinelis)	9278	Classification, Catalog, Map	Content-Dependent Authorizer	for alledia (latent viep or milipate, ment, reserve)	no	Confidentiality, Integrity	no	N/A			N/A	design	N/A	N/A
146 SCRIStUDIO: A security pattern integration tool	Bouaziz R, Kammoun S.	###	2018 International Conference on Internation Technology for Organizations Development, 17800-2016	\perp	Development methodology		N/A	no	N/A		no			N/A	design, coding		N/A
147 SeCMER: A tool to gain control of security requirements evolution	Regner G. Mosani F. Pai F. Sal T.F. Varris, Na Y.	2011	serina Nationa Statistica Nationa (coloning administration National Additional Resignator activation National Residential Colonia	994 LNCS	Verification		N/A	N/A	Not specified (Confidentiality?)	N/A	N/A	N/A		N/A	requirement analysis	Yes	N/A
148 Sectet: An extensible framework for the realization of secure inter-organizational workflow	Halvar M. Streu R. Agreiter St. Novek A.		Internet Research	16 5	Development methodology		None	None	Integrity, Confidentiality, Non-repodation	none	none	UML	MDA	Yes (case study)		none	Web Services
149 Secure component based applications through security patterns	Bouaziz R., Coulette B.	2012			Application		N/A	N/A	Integrity, and confidentiality		N/A	UML	MDD + CBSE	case study	Design		N/A
150 Secure engineering and modelling of a metering devices system	Ruiz JF, Arjona M, Mata A, Carolano N.	2013			Empirical and case study	N/A	N/A	Yes	Confidentiality, Integrity, Assilability		N/A	UML		case study	analysis, design	Yes	Not specified
151 Securing analysis patterns	Fernandez E.B., Yuan X	2007		2007	Development methodology	trans from Antonian price (apri, price foliace Seriespose Stat)	No	No	Integrity	N/A	N/A	UML	Not specified		Damain analysis, Requirements, Analysis.		N/A
152 Securing distributed systems using patterns: A survey			ا مناما	31 5	Survey		N/A	No	CIA	N/A	Υ?	Not specified	Not specified	No	Not specified	N/A	Not specified
	Uzunav AV, Fernandro ESI, Fallmar K.			0.	our voy												
153 Securing anti-applications with horizor Polisham' An architectural pagements for systematic input calibration with security patterns.	Userar AV, Fernandru EB, Falhear K. Sohn JW., Ryoo J.	2015	Presentings - 10th International Conference on Auditality, Relativity and Security, ARES 2013		Development methodology	intercepting validator		N/A	avalability	repreparingue nationales (such as field injuries and 1990)			N/A	Yes (case study)	design, implementation	N/A	PHP
153 Structure and applications with batter Philabers An analysis but experient for quiterants input statistics with season's patterns. 154 Security and dependability in ambient infalligence scenarios. The communication prototype	Uzunav A.V., Fernandra E.B., Falhear K.	2015	Prescribigs - 15th International Conference on Australian Reliability and Decemb, AMES 2013 ISSU 2009 - 15th International Conference on Enterprise Internation Systems, Prescribings.	ISAS	Development methodology Development methodology		N/A	N/A N/A	avalability Confidentiality, integrity, availability	denying services	N/A	UML	SERENITY approach	Yes (case study) N/A	design, implementation Analysis, design	SERENITY model	PHP Antienfordigense (Anti exceptions
153 154 155 Security and dependability in arbitration statisticates scenarios. The communication protetype 155 Security design patterns: Survey and evaluation	Uzunav A.V., Fernandra E.B., Falhear K.	2015	Prescribigs - 15th International Conference on Australian Reliability and Decemb, AMES 2013 ISSU 2009 - 15th International Conference on Enterprise Internation Systems, Prescribings.	ISAS	Development methodology Development methodology Survey		N/A N/A		avalability Confidentially, integrity, availability Integrity	denying services	N/A	UML UML			Analysis, design		PHP Assistativity on the Assistation A
153 temps an administration from Teach. A softward page of a game in part of the communication protection. 154 discourtly and dependability in arbitrat infelligence accurate. The communication protection. 155 Security design patterns: Survey and evaluation. 156 Security modeling for service-inferred systems using accountly pattern reformment approach.	Uzunav A.V., Fernandra E.B., Falhear K.	2015 2009 2007 2014	Prescribigs - 15th International Conference on Australian Reliability and Decemb, AMES 2013 ISSU 2009 - 15th International Conference on Enterprise Internation Systems, Prescribings.	13 2	Development methodology Development methodology		N/A None	N/A	Confidentiality, integrity, availability	N/A no	no	UML	SERENITY approach	N/A Yes	N/A design	SERENITY model N/A pre (JML based trails for scale generative)	N/A Web Services
153 154 155 Security and dependability in ambient intelligence scenarios. The communication protetype 155 Security design patterns: Survey and evaluation	Uzunav A.V., Fernandra E.B., Falhear K.	2015 2009 2007 2014 2014	Consider the Constitution of Const	ISAS	Development methodology Development methodology	N/A	N/A None N/A	N/A Yes	Confidentiality, integrity, availability	N/A no N/A	no N/A	UML UML	SERENITY approach N/A Requirement analysis, design	N/A Yes	N/A design	SERENITY model N/A pn (1Mt. bared trail for each generation) N/A	Antienfraligenee (Anti executions N/A
153 temps an administration from Teach. A softward page of a game in part of the communication protection. 154 discourtly and dependability in arbitrat infelligence accurate. The communication protection. 155 Security design patterns: Survey and evaluation. 156 Security modeling for service-inferred systems using accountly pattern reformment approach.	Uneser AV, Fernando EB, Faltere K. Sohn JW., Ryoo J. Amenderes A, Maller A, Belle A, Bernard S Learning W-H, Wood A, Farer A, Edibali M. Mark M. Marker A, Marker A, Marker B. Marker A, Marker A, Marker B. Marker A, Marker B. Marker A, Marker B. Marker B.	2015 2009 2007 2014	Consider the Constitution of Const	ISAS	Development methodology Development methodology Survey Development methodology	N/A	N/A None	N/A Yes yes Yes Yes	Confidentiality, integrity, availability Integrity Confidentiality, integrity and availability	N/A no N/A	no	UML UML UML	SERENITY approach N/A Requirement analysis, design	N/A Yes yes(case study)	N/A design	SERENITY model N/A por 10/16, barred bath for sale paraelatical N/A N/A	N/A Web Services
153 154 1555 Security design patterns: Survey and evaluation 156 Security and representation patterns: Survey and evaluation 157 Security pattern evaluation survey and evaluation 157 Security pattern evaluation	Sohn JW., Ryon J. America A. Maka A. Maka A. Somo T. Interior W. A. Mara A. Terra A. Salaha M. Duncan I. Majindi-Haghest J.D.	2015 2009 2007 2014 2014	Consider the Constitution of Const	ISAS	Development methodology Development methodology Survey Development methodology Analysis	N/A	N/A None N/A	N/A Yes yes Yes	Confidentiality, integrity, availability Integrity Confidentiality Confidentiality	N/A no N/A N/A	no N/A	UML UML Not specified Text, formula	SERENITY approach N/A Requirement analysis, design Not-specified SPL	N/A Yes yes(case study) N/A	N/A design N/A	SERENITY model N/A pn (1Mt. bared trail for each generation) N/A	N/A Web Services N/A
153 Image am addition of their Action A additional for section by additional and additional and additional and additional and additional additi	Sohn JW., Ryon J. America A. Maka A. Maka A. Somo T. Interior W. A. Mara A. Terra A. Salaha M. Duncan I. Majindi-Haghest J.D.	2015 2009 2007 2014 2014 2008 2011	The second section of the sec	ISAS	Development methodology Development methodology Survey Development methodology Analysis Specification	N/A	N/A None N/A N/A	N/A Yes yes Yes Yes	Confidentiality, integrity, availability Integrity Confidentiality Confidentiality	N/A no N/A N/A N/A	no N/A N/A	UML UML Not specified Text, formula	SERENITY approach N/A Requirement analysis, design Not-specified SPL N/A	N/A Yes yes(case study) N/A N/A	N/A design N/A N/A	SERENITY model N/A por 10/16, barred bath for sale paraelatical N/A N/A	N/A Web Services N/A N/A
153 Imms an administration from the following the common teachers with the communication protection 154 security and dependability in arbitrat intelligence scenarios. The communication protection 155 Security design patterns: Survey and evaluation 156 security modeling for service unique security authors would security pattern reforment approach 157 Security pattern evaluation 158 Security Pattern Lattice: A formal model to organize Security Patterns 159 Security pattern mining: Systematic review and proposal	Sonn JW., Ryoo J., Sonn J., W., Sonn J., Sonn J., W., Sonn J., Sonn J.	2015 2009 2007 2014 2014 2018 2011 2009	Consider Conference of the Con	13 2	Development methodology Development methodology Survey Development methodology Analysis Specification	N/A	N/A None N/A N/A N/A	N/A Yes yes Yes Yes N/A	Confidentiality, integrity, availability Integrity Confidentiality Confidentiality	N/A no N/A N/A N/A	no N/A N/A N/A N/A	UML UML Not specified Text, formula N/A	SERENITY approach N/A Requirement analysis, design Not-specified SPL N/A	N/A Yes yes(case study) N/A N/A No No	N/A design N/A N/A	SERENITY model N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A	N/A Web Services N/A N/A N/A
153 Imms an addition of their feature, it and indicated any long relative to the communication protection of the communication of the communication protection of the communication of the	Sonn JW., Ryoo J., Sonn J	2015 2009 2007 2014 2014 2008 2011 2009 2006	Contact Conference on Extension and Computer Engineering Software and Systems Modeling	13 2 45	Development methodology Development methodology Survey Development methodology Analysis Specification	N/A	N/A None N/A N/A N/A N/A	N/A Yes yes Yes Yes N/A no	Confidentially, resignity, evaluability Integrity Confidentially, bragily, and exhibitly Confidentially, integrity, confidentiality Confidentially, bragily, evaluability confidentially, bragily, evaluability confidentially, bragily, evaluability	N/A no N/A N/A N/A N/A not specified	no N/A N/A N/A N/A	UML UML Not specified Text, formula N/A Not specified	SERENITY approach N/A Requirement analysis, design Not-specified SPL N/A	N/A Yes yes(case study) N/A N/A No No yes(case study)	N/A design N/A N/A architecture design	SERENITY model N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A none	N/A Web Services N/A N/A N/A no
153 154 155 Security and dependantly is undeed to state as a common to state on montpotent production. 155 Security and dependantly is undeed to state as a common to state on montpotent production. 156 Security models for service released systems using security pattern referenced approach 157 Security pattern Lattice A formal model to organize Security Patterns 159 Security pattern mining: Systematic review and proposal 160 Security patterns and a methodology to apply them 161 Security patterns and requirements for intermet-based applications.	Sohn JW., Ryoo J. Sohn JW., Ryoo J. Sohn JW. Sohn Sohn Sohn Sohn Sohn Sohn Sohn Sohn	2015 2009 2007 2014 2014 2008 2011 2009 2006	Software and Systems Modeling Advances in Information Security Internet Research	13 2 45	Development methodology Development methodology Survey Development methodology Analysis Specification	N/A	N/A None N/A N/A N/A N/A denial-of-service	N/A Yes yes Yes Yes N/A no Yes	Confidentially, integrity, availability. Integrity Confidentially integrity, confidentiallity integrity, confidentiallity Confidentially, leaguity, availability confidentially, leaguity, availability all	N/A no N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A not specified N/A	no N/A N/A N/A N/A no	UML UML Not specified Text, formula N/A Not specified UML	SERENTY approach N/A N/A Neurament entries design Not-specified SPL N/A Not specified Not specified Not specified	N/A Yes yes(case study) N/A N/A No No yes(case study)	N/A design N/A N/A architecture design design Design	SERENITY model N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A none none	N/A Web Services N/A N/A N/A no no

164	Managed N. Wales M. Completin	2005	67-4 LEGG	Specification			Yes	avalability?	N/A	N/A	UML?	N/A	N/A	Implemention	N/A	N/A
165 Security patterns med agent orionted utilizans engineering A samplementary student for disvelaging secure information systems. 165 Security patterns modeling and formalization for pattern based development of secure activance systems.	Models of P. Well M. Gogin P.	2016 Innovations in Systems and Software Engineering	12 2	Verification		N/A	N/A	N/A => data authenticity	N/A	N/A	Formula	14, 73	0		N/A	N/A
166 Security patterns: A method for constructine secure and efficient inter-company coordination systems	Yorkish M. Marker E. Polisiania A.	2004		Development methodolom	N/A	N/A	Yes	avalability?		N/A	text	MDA	case study	development		N/A
167 Security patterns: Comparing modeling approaches	Turney N., Harrison J., Francisco N.	2010		Specification		, , .		a value into i	, , .	, , , .	00/10		ouco cuay	acroiopinoni	, , , .	117.71
168 Security requirements specification in service-oriented business process management	Marriel M. Thomas I. Mainel C.	2009 reseased to Service Systems Statem Statems Industrial and Personal Propertiess 2009 reseased to Service Statement on Auditability Reliability and Empire, ANSI 2001		Application			N/A	Confidentiality interrity		N/A	N/A	M. 41. 41	N/A	Process management	N/A	
169 Security solution frames and security patterns for authorization in distributed, collaborative systems	Maria M. Cross Co. Co. Co.		55	Application	Authorization pattern	N/A	Yes	authorization	N/A	N/A	UML	MDA	case study		N/A	Distributed system
170 Selecting proper security patterns using text classification	Hashaminariad SMH Jalii S	2009		Selection	N/A	N/A	Yes(classification)	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Experiment	·		N/A
171 SERENITY Aware System Development Process	nasnemnejad s.m.n., Jani s.	2009 Advances in Information Security	45	Davidore and and delicate		N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	,	N/A	Davis implementation		N/A
172 SERENITY pattern-based software development life-cycle	Sanchez-Cid F Maña A	2008	10	Development metrodology		N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	UML		N/A	Design, implementation		N/A
173 Software engineering techniques applied to Aml: Security patterns	Sanchez-Cid F., Maria A.	2006		Development metrodology		N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A		Case study	Implemention	Serenity Metriodology	N/A
174 Standardisine humans andication security assessments with nature-driven audit automations	Tryfonas T. Kearney B.	2008 Computer Standards and Interfaces	30 4	Application	14, 71	14, 71	Yes (Fig. 1)	14, 71	N/A	N/A	UML		N/A	Implemention	audit automation	N/A
175 Structural analysis of the check point pattern	Trytonas 1., Rearriey B.	2014	00 1	Analysis	0.10		Yes	N/A	N/A	N/A	Codecharts		N/A	Analysis or Design	addic addoniadon	N/A
176 Supporting security sensitive architecture design	Rahar M.A. Wanar X. Control I	2005		Application	Creck Point security pattern		Yes	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A		, ,	N/A	N/A
177 Survey on body of knowledge regarding software security	Hazeyama A.	2012	STIZ DACS	Survey	none(包括)	none(包括)	Yes	N/A	XSS, SQLinjection	N/A	UML		N/A	none	N/A	N/A
178 Technical patterns for long term trusted archiving	riazoyama 7t.	2009 Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on District 1005 2009		Classification Catalog Man	Horio(E)	no	Yes	integrity and authenticity	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	case study		N/A	N/A
179 TESEM: A tool for verifying security design pattern applications by model testing	Pentur J. Sejill E. Kritalar T. James Balli A.	2015 Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Digital Society, ICDS 2009 2015 Int SEE to International Conference on United Section of Vision SEE VISION - Proceedings		Verification	generic solution patterns	一般的	No	N/A	N/A	N/A		N/A	ounceiment(eversion)	7 triary 515	model testing tool	N/A
180 The credentials pattern	Monteon P. Er	2006 PLuP 2001 - PLuP Pattern Languages of Progress 2001 Conference Proceedings		Application	cradentials nottor-	ria i i	No	availabliity	tamparing or final	N/A	UML	N/A	Example	architecture	N/A	N/A
181 The history-based authentication pattern	morrison P., Fernandez E.B.	2014 ACM International Conference Proceeding Series		Application	Authentication	None	Yes	availability	N/A	N/A	UML	N/A	Example	Occupation and	N/A	N/A
182 The ISDF framework: Integrating security patterns and best practices	Alkussayer A., Allen W.H.	2009 Communications in Computer and Information Science	36	Development	Auurentication patterns	110110	Yes	Confidentially authorization Confidentially integrity	N/A	N/A	ISDF	N/A	Example	Operation and maintenance	N/A	N/A
183 The nature of order: From security patterns and best practices	Alkussayer A., Allen W.H. Hafiz M. Adamozyk P.	2012 Communications in Computer and Information Science	-	Development methodology Classification, Catalog, Map	none(包括)		Yes	N/A	N/A	N/A	Pattern Language	,	N/A	Megurement, architecture, implementation	N/A	N/A
184 The creatical ambienting of a process for eligibles and designing security in web sensing systems	Hafiz M., Adamczyk P.	2009 Information and Software Technology	51 12	Classification, Catalog, Map	none(包括)	none(匀括)	Yes	IN/ A	N/A	N/A	Pattern Language	N/A	case study	arabita atura	IN/ A	N/A
185 The practical application of a process for eliciting and designing security in web service systems 185 The security survey and analysis on supervisory control and data acquisition communication	Guillimes C., Rosain D.G., Fernándor Medina E.	2014 Journal of Computer Science		Analysis	HOHE (EM)	HOHE (EM)	No	Connidentiality, integrity	11/ /\	N/A	UML	,	N/A		N/A	SCADA System
The security survey and analysis on supervisory control and data acquisition communication 186 The Security Twin Peaks	Shahaad A, Mina S, Alonqilah A, Man M.	2011	10 10	Allalysis	enhiesture patient for SCACA summunication		Yes	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	security twin peaks	discussion		N/A	N/A
187 Thinking towards a pattern language for predicate based encryption pryoto-systems	Royman T, Nalman K, Soundarians R, Sohnide H, Yu Y.	2012	6540 LNCS	Application	architectual security patient for our-developms	N/A	Yes	Unclear	N/A	N/A	N/A	Unclear	Critique	Unclear	N/A	Unclear
188 Threat and countermeasure patterns for cloud computing	De Muijnck-Hughes J., Duncan I. Okubo T., Watasuchi Y., Kanava N.	2014			RBAC, etc.	Spoofing, etc.	Yes	Unclear	Unclear (Threat pattern)	N/A	UML	Unclear	Example	Unclear	N/A	Cloud
189 Threat assessment in the cloud environment - A quantitative approach for security pattern selection		2014 2015 SE 61 Marratinal Behings on Registerents Patients, RePa 2011 - Prosentings 2016		Selection		N/A	No	Officieal		N/A	N/A		Case study		N/A	Cloud
190 Threat assessment in the cloud environment - A quantitative approach for security pattern selection 190 Towards a better integration of patterns in secure component-based systems design	Anand P., Ryoo J., Kim H., Kim E.	2011		Application		N/A	No	Unclear (N/A)	N/A	N/A	UML profile	Officiear	Example	Unclear	N/A	Cioud
	Bouaziz R, Hamid B, Desnos N.	2006 Proceedings of the 6th International Network Conference, INC 2006	6786 LNCS PART 5	Application	N/A	N/A	Yes	Unclear (N/A)	N/A	N/A	N/A	Unclear	N/A	Uniclear	N/A	Unclear
100	Blackwell C.	2004 Proceedings of the 6th International Network Conference, INC 2006 2014 Cobernatemic Uniform Dealer Patterns with Security and Attack Patterns		Classification, Catalog, Map			No	Officiear		N/A	N/A		N/A	Unclear		Unclear
400	Blackwell C.	2014 Cyberpatterns: Unifying Design Patterns with Security and Attack Patterns 2009 Presenters - Nermatical Relations on Dicidage and Eurer Statems Assistations DESA		Classification, Catalog, Map	SSL. TPM		INO	Confidentiality, integrity and availability	N/A	N/A	Formula	Unclear	Example	Unclear	N/A	Unclear
104	Fuchs A., Gürgens S., Rudolph C.	2006	-	Application		N/A	Yes because of integration	Confidentiality and integrity	N/A	N/A	UML	MDA	Example	Unclear	IN/ A	Unclear
105	Hafner M., Alam M., Breu R.	2011	4199 LNCS	Application		N/A	Yes as metamodel	Availability	,	N/A	N/A		N/A		N/A	Unclear
Towards a pattern-based security methodology to build secure information systems 196	Drick More field E. Great J. Sonakor Moke E.	2015	-	Development methodology	IN/ A	N/A	No	Availability	Misuse pattern	N/A	UML	Unclear		Entire	N/A	
	Fernandez E.B., Yimam D.			A so a la so i o	Activationium, activation, energetion	N/A	No	Confidentiality and integrity		N/A	N/A	Uniclear	Example	Unclear Development	N/A	Unclear
197 Towards continuous information security audit	Korlovs D., Cjaputa K., Kirikova M.	2016 CEUR Workshop Proceedings	1564	Analysis			No	Confidentiality, integrity and availability	Yes but a little	N/A		Business process modeling	Example		N/A	Unclear
	Alebrahim A., Heisel M.		8708	Development methodology				Arthenticity, Confidentiality and integrity			Problem frame, UML		Example	Requirements	-	Unclear
199 Towards precise security patterns	Serrano D., Malfa A., Sotirious AD.	2008 Proceedings - Identificated Relatings on Dissilators and Expert Systems Applications, DESA		Development methodology		N/A	No	Confidentially, integrity, availability, etc.	No	N/A	UML like	Unclear	Scenario	Registrateiro analysis, design, implementation		Unclear
200 Usability and security patterns 201 Using satterns to understand and compare Web services security products and standards	Ferreira A., Rusu C., Roncagliolo S.	2009 Assessings of the last International Conferences on Advances in Computer Human Internations, ACM 2001		Development methodology		None N/A	Yes	Availability, popularity	None N/A	N/A	None UML	N/A		Evaluation	N/A N/A	N/A
000	Fernandez E.B., Delessy N.		2006	Classification, Catalog, Map			Yes	Confidentiality, integrity		IN/ A	UNIL	UML modeling	Example	architecture design	IN/ A	Web Services
000	Heckman M.R., Schell R.R.	2016 Information (Switzerland)	1 2	Verification	TCB subset security pattern	None	Yes	Mandatory Access Control	None	Completeness, Verflability, Isolation	Trusted Network Interpretation	Claud	Sruded Computer System Svaluation Criteria			\vdash
203 Using security patterns for modelling security capabilities in grid systems 204 Using security patterns to combine security metrics	Aziz B., Blackwell C.	2014 Pracestry - SEE this International Repression on Enriche Cristness Replant Engineering SCHE 2014 2008 INSERT 2001 - 3rd International Conference on Applicability Structure, and Reliability Proceedings		Application	Equation patient, biterited Certificate patient	None	Yes	Trustworthiness	None	Signature and passeord authentication	Virtual Organization	Cloud	Evaluate the design space	Virtual Organization Lifecycle	A.T.14	Grid Operating System
005	Higman T, Standarlate R, Huggers C, Joseph N.			Verification	Antonionius Esteras, Sanon Lagge, Audi Stanograv	Deals with heatility of the environment	Yes	Integrity, Confidentiality, Availability	black box metrics not considered	security objectives of a system	from objections -> patterns -> matrics		dependency tree		ATM example	
205 Using security patterns to develop secure systems	Season St. Select Select April Select Season	2010 Sultane Segmenting for Senare Systems Industrial and Pennanch Peropertiess		Development methodology	Misuse pattern	Misuse Activities	Yes	Access Control	Threats to a particular resource	Dimension Graph	UML	Metamodeling	Multidmensional Classification	Analysis, Design, Implementation	UML and OCL tools	SQL based systems
206 Using security patterns to tailor software process	Wagner R, Fontoura LM, Fontoura AR.	2011 ISS 2011 - Proceedings of the 2011 informational Conference on Column Engineering and Cossisings Engineering		Development methodology		Descharanes, Valentility Assessed	V	Security (Unclear or no)	Assess Threats, Assess Vulnerabilities	NI	LINAL	Related in that Processe (6,5% to Pyrocesses Salestra)	Prioritization of Process Americana sholy:	Software Development Lifecycle	SMT-TOOL PRIMA-TOOL PINT-TOOL	SMT Framework
207 Using UML and security patterns to teach secure systems design	Fernandez E.B., Petrie M.M.L.	2005 ASEE Annual Conference and Exposition, Conference Proceedings	\vdash	Knowledge base and repository	Role based access control pattern	None	Yes	C	None	None	UML		None	00 design	UML	Annual Concession of March of
208 Validating security design patterns application using model testing	Stant T. Selback, State S. Royal Stationals Statement	2013 Proceedings - 2013 International Conference on Audidating Reliability and Security, ARES 2013	\vdash	Verification	Security Requirement patterns, Security Society patterns	None	Yes	Security	None	None	UML and UCL		None	Testing	USE	None
209 Verifying implementation of security design patterns using a test template	Trainer Millians V Berland Charact Charle V Regul Contrado	2014 ************************************	\vdash	Verification	Role based access control pattern	None	Yes	Security	None	None	UML		Test template	Testing		None
210 Vulnerability-based security pattern categorization in search of missing patterns	Anand P., Ryoo J., Kazman R.	2014 Proceedings - Bit International Conference on Availability, Polishibity and Descript, ARES 2014	$\vdash \vdash$	Classification, Catalog, Map		N/A	No	Confidentiality, integrity and availability	OWASP vulnerability categorization	N/A	N/A	,	N/A		N/A	None
211 Web security patterns for analysis and design	Okubo T., Tanaka H.	2008 PLaPOR - 15th Conference on Pattern Languages of Programs, Proceedings	$\vdash \vdash$	Empirical and case study	Abuse pattern	Abuse, Leaks, Disclosure, Tampering	Yes	I.E.A. authorization, assess control, logging	Chautherized use, Unintended use, Duli	None	None		None	None	None	None
212 Wireless Information security system via role based access control pattern use case design	King A.C., Subramanian K., Kanhaa V.	2008 - Communicação de la 2000 inservaciona di colonoca en Compulsiç Communicacion en 2000 a 2000	0 -	Application	RBAC	N/A	N/A	Confidentiality	N/A	N/A	N/A		N/A	,	N/A	N/A
213 XML context's security patterns language: Description and syntax	Barhoom T.S.M., Shen-Sheng Z.	2007 Information Technology Journal	6 7	Application	Sensity of ISS teachers parties, ISS Sciencely Senties	None	Yes	Security	None	None	None	XML	XML Digital Signature	None	any XML tool	any platform
214 A classification methodology for security patterns to help fix software weaknesses	Regainia L., Salva S., Ecuhours C.	2017 Presentings of IEEE ICES International Conference on Computer Septimes and Applications, ACCESS		Classification, Catalog, Map		N/A	Yes (depend benefit, impair, alternative, sanifat)	Authority Haylis Austrily Society, Workpris Soldier	Vulnerability, weakness, OWE, CAPED	Number of weaknesses	UML, Security Activity Graph (SAG)		Example	Requirements, Analysis, Design		N/A
215 Exploiting traceability uncertainty between software architectural models and extra-functional results	Trubiani C, Ghabi A, Egyed A.	2017 Journal of Systems and Software	125	Analysis		N/A	N/A	Confidentiality	N/A	security level based on traceability link	N/A	UML modeling	case study	architecture design	SoEfTraceAnalyzer	None
216 Guiding the Selection of Security Patterns for Real-Time Systems	Muti A, Hamid R, Lancose A, Bruel JM.	2017 Presentings of the MISI International Conference on Engineering of Complete Computer Systems, MISCOL	igspace	Selection	SecureComm pattern, Firewall pattern	N/A	Yes	Data integrity, Confidentiality, Authoritisty	Specing Malainus alteration, Decial of service	N/A	UML, MARTE		Case Study (SCADA)	Requirements, Analysis, Design	Pappon, SECON Model Development Tools	N/A
217 Addressing Security Challenges in Cloud Computing - A Pattern-Based Approach	Anand P., Ryoo J., Kim H.	2017 Presenting - 2011 to International Conference on Enhance Essenting and Encourage ICEES 2011	igspace	Development methodology		N/A	Yes	Data integrity, Confidentiality, Authoritisty	Data Breaches, Data Loss	N/A	N/A	Pattern Language	N/A	Requirements, Analysis, Design	N/A	N/A
218 A methodology of security pattern classification and of attack-defense tree generation	Regainia L., Salva S.	2017 GIBBY 2017 - Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Information Springer Security and Princery	3017-Jensey	Classification, Catalog, Map	Input Guard, Application Firewall		Yes	Web application attack (CAPEC)	Web application weakness (CWE)	N/A	diagram, tabular	Attack Defence Trees (ADTrees)	Web application attack (CAPEC-39)	Requirements, Analysis, Design	Sendings (handson), Elektronian, last Teories)	N/A

Hironori WASHIZAKI, Tian XIA, Natsumi KAMATA, Yoshiaki FUKAZAWA, Hideyuki KANUKA, Takehisa KATO, Masayuki YOSHINO, Takao OKUBO, Shinpei OGATA, Haruhiko KAIYA, Atsuo HAZEYAMA, Takafumi TANAKA, Nobukazu YOSHIOKA, and G PRIYALAKSHMI

219 Systematic pattern approach for safety and security co-engineering in the automotive domain		2017	IAM INC	1	I .	N/A	Yes	intogrity	STRIDE	None	None	I	C4d	I		
			TOTAL COLC.	Development methodology	, ,	-							Case study		MS Threat Modeling Tool 2016	Automotive domain
220 liber-action before explication: The use of cybernescuity domain towardings to educate sufficient explicates cultures relatives and action of the complete complete to educate sufficient explications and complete com	Nation T., Gold N., Parguson RJ, Sampson A.	2017	19379 DIVCS	Knowledge base and repository			No	Unclear		None	VAP template		Experiment			N/A
221 Model-based design of reusable secure connectors	Shin M., Gomaa H., Pathirage D.	2017 CEUR Workshop Proceedings	2019	Application		N/A	Yes		N/A	Performance comparison	UML		Experiment	Design		N/A
222 Using data integration for security testing	Salva S., Regainia L.	2017	19539 LINCH	Verification		No. species error viscostyling de armitel Missburne	Yes	N/A	DREAD, STRIDE	Malany and servotrons of smaling bad seams		N/A	Experiment	Treat making and sensity test near execution.	ADTool	data-store
223 Supporting secure business process design via security process patterns	Argyropoulos N. Mouratids H. Fish A.	2017 Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing	287	Application		N/A	No		User Impresonation (in example)	Questionnaire	BPMN	Process modelling	Experiment	Business process modeling	Secure Tropos	N/A
224 Security knowledge representation artifacts for creating secure IT systems	Ruiz JF, Arjana M, Mata A, Ruskiph C.	2017 Computers and Security	64	Knowledge base and repository		*****	Yes	CI	N. V. had asserts haden able to represent any of them.	Assuracne, validation, verification	UML	N/A	example	Requirements, design	No	Common and almost specific an assempte in Web services
225 Anti-spyware security design patterns	Day St. C South State St. Barranders July 9	2016		Application	Anti-spyware pattern	N/A	Yes	N/A	N/A	accuracy	feature list	N/A	Experiment	Runtime	WEKA	general
226 Framework for engineering complex security requirements patterns	Mazo R., Feltus C.	2016 SETE 6th International Conference on IT Convergence and Security, ACTICS 2016		Development methodology	N/A	N/A	Yes	Confidentiality	N/A	N/A	UML	N/A	No	Requirements	No	Complex systems such as cloud
227 Threat Modeling in Cyber-Physical Systems	Fernandez E.B.	2016		Analysis	No	Theft of service misuse.	Yes, rel between threat and attack outlern	N/A	metamodel of both is provided	N/A	UML OCL	MDD	No	Design, Architecture	No	Cyber-phicical systems (CPS)
228 Secure design patterns for security in smart metering systems	Ur-Rehman O., Zivic N.	2016		Application		No	No	N/A		N/A	UML	N/A	No	Design	No	Smart Metering systems
229 A Metamodel for Security and Privacy Knowledge in Cloud Services		2016 Proceedings - 2016 EEE World Congress on Services, SERVICES 2016		Development methodology		manus uses medicine in deal computer	Υ	CIA	Cloud	N/A	modeling using metamodel	development using metamodel	only case study		N/A	Cloud
230 Building secure cloud architectures using patterns	Fernandez E.B.	2016 Proceedings - 2014 IEEE International Conference on Clinal Engineering Workshops, IC2007 2014		Development methodology			Υ	STRIDE		N/A	Υ		qualitative validation	N/A	N/A	Cloud
231 An analytical study of security patterns	Ponde P., Shinwalkar S., Kreiner C.	2016 ACM International Conference Proceeding Series		Classification, Catalog, Map	N/A	N/A		CIA			N/A	N/A	N/A			N/A
232 Modeling and security in cloud ecosystems	Personier Ell., Nobida N., Wallindo H., Spell BH.	2016 Future Internet	8 2	Development methodology		None	Yes	unclear	unclear	, , , .	,		,		None	cloud
233 Modeling and analyzing security patterns using high level petri nets	He X Fu Y	2016 Pusselige of the International Conference on Enhance Engineering and November Engineering, IEEE	2010-Jerusy	Verification		None	Yes			Reachiability				Design?	PIPE+	Cyber physical systems
234 Towards the integration of security patterns in UML Component-based Applications	Mati A, Hamid R, Lancese A, Broad JM.	2016 CEUR Workshop Proceedings	1693				None	None		,			Example			None
235 Model-based real-time evaluation of security patterns: A SCADA system case study	Meti A. Lanusse A. Herrid B. Bruel JM.	2016	9923 LNCS	Analysis		N/A	Yes		N.I. / A			SCADA security	'			
236 Automatic enforcement of security properties	Horcas JM., Pinto M., Fuentes L.	2016				N/A	Yes	Security, Realtime Confidenciality		N/A	doi Style		, , ,,	,	Yes(UML tool)	
007			10 0	Application		-					NI / A			Analysis, Design		Unclear
23 / Adaption of integrated secure guide for secure software development lifecycle	Lee KH., Park Y.B.	2016 International Journal of Security and its Applications	10 6	Development methodology			N/A	N/A			N/A		comparison	represent, design, implementation, testing		N/A
238 Software-security patterns: Degree of maturity	Bunke M.	2015 ACM International Conference Proceeding Series	W-P-AU-WH	Analysis				N/A			N/A	N/A	projengem SLOC for pattern's implementation)	All	N/A	N/A
239 Cuiding the selection of security patterns based on security requirements and pattern classification	Mutii A, Hamid B, Lanucus A, Bruel JM.	2015 ACM International Conference Proceeding Series		Selection	Administration for the larger series that differentiates VPS		N/A	Surfaceority English Automity, Automiters, Nov. Speciation		N/A	SEPM conceptual model		Example	High level design		SCADA System
240 Improvement of security patterns strategy for information security audit applications	Atymtayeva L, Abdel-Aty M.	2015 MMD 2011 - Proceedings of the lith International Responsion on Basicona Madeling and Enforces Design		Knowledge base and repository	N/A		-	N/A			security ontology	N/A	N/A	development		N/A
241 Building Secure Applications Using Pattern-Based Design Fragments	Rimba P., Zhu L., Xu X., Sun D.	2015 Proceedings of the EEE Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems	2016 - January	Application	seure leger paliers, marginal slarage paliers	None	N/A	Confidentiality	attack analysis	N/A	N/A	Pattern-based, model-based	case study	analysis and design		N/A
242 A survey on security patterns	Yeshisha N., Washisaki H., Maruyama K.	2008 Progress in Informatics	5	Survey	Secure Logger	N/A	Yes	All	N/A	N/A	UML	N/A	N/A	All	N/A	N/A
243 Security patterns for automated continuous auditing	Kearney B., Tryfonas T.	2008 Information Security Journal	17 1	Application	many in table1	N/A	Yes	accountability	N/A	N/A	UML	N/A	Case Study (SAP R/3 ERP System)	N/A	NO	ERP